Category Archives: Religious Liberty

The American journal Commonweal has recently published a book review of Thomas Crean’s and Alan Fimister’s Integralism: a manual of political philosophy.  The book review misrepresents the book in certain ways and criticises it in others.  The present article will explain some of the misrepresentations and analyse the criticisms.

The most serious misrepresentation lies in the reviewer’s statement that “Integralism clearly breaks with Vatican II’s teaching on religious liberty”.  The last ecumenical council’s document on religious liberty, Dignitatis humanae, meets the criteria for an infallible definition in its central teaching.  More precisely, it seems to contain a definition of a ‘secondary object’ of the magisterium, that is, something which may not be directly divinely revealed, but which can be taught infallibly insofar as it has a necessary connection with divine revelation.  But according to the ‘Doctrinal Commentary on the Professio Fidei’ produced by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1998, anyone who denies a secondary object of the magisterium which has thus been taught infallibly, is no longer in full communion with the Catholic Church.  Crean and Fimister, however, not only do not deny the central teaching of Dignitatis humanae; they take pains to explain what this teaching means, and how it is compatible with what Dignitatis humanae calls elsewhere “the duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ”.  In accusing Crean and Fimister of upholding a position which would deprive them of communion with the Catholic Church, the editors of Commonweal have fallen into an error which they need to retract, lest they be liable to prosecution under canon 220 of the Code of Canon Law, which guarantees the right of the faithful to their good name.

Another serious, not to say libellous, misrepresentation in Commonweal’s book review is its claim that the authors are “driven more by nostalgia for the ancien régime than loyalty either to theological authorities or the Church’s magisterium”.  The phrase ancien régime, used without qualification, refers to those royal houses that lost their pre-eminence as a result of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, especially the house of Bourbon.  The reviewer offers no evidence for his claim that the authors of Integralism are motivated even partly, let alone principally, by affection for these royal dynasties, an affection which in fact is not particularly common among Englishmen.  The reason why no evidence is offered is that there is none to offer: nothing in their manual suggests that its authors believe that the return of these royal houses is a necessary or natural prelude to the building of Christendom.  The reviewer is writing at random.

Connected to this error is his claim that the authors’ ideal is hereditary monarchy.  In fact, they examine the arguments for and against hereditary monarchy, without coming down on either side, concluding rather to the desirability of a variety of forms of polity.  The reviewer has perhaps misunderstood their statement that it seems desirable to include some element of hereditary power within a polity: but this need not mean hereditary monarchy, as the example of the House of Lords in Great Britain shows and, as they point out, citizenship is hereditary in almost all polities. They quote at length Leo XIII’s praise of the U.S. Constitution as a “well-ordered republic”. Equally astray is his claim that Crean and Fimister are followers of the 17th century author, Robert Filmer, for whom patriarchal monarchy was the only lawful form of government; they expressly state that Filmer’s account would apply only to unfallen man.

The reviewer errs, again, in claiming that Crean and Fimister recommend that women not have a right to vote except when they are at the head of a household.  They say, on the contrary, that it is fitting that all citizens enjoy a basic equality of suffrage, and women are explicitly included in this.  They go on to say that nothing prevents certain citizens from enjoying further titles to suffrage, such as education, military service or the headship of a family.  Integralism rejects not women’s suffrage but the dogmatic insistence on the principle ‘one person one vote’.  Likewise, there is nothing in the book to suggest that women should not occupy public office, whether legislative, judicial or executive.  So much for the reviewer’s claim that women are “written out of its narrative”.

He is also incorrect to claim that Integralism holds that all non-Catholics in a restored Christendom must be denied voting rights.  It states, rather that the higher public offices would be restricted to Catholics, while at the same time allowing for representatives of non-Catholic bodies, whose task would be to protect the rights and interests of such bodies, including the right of monotheists to freedom of worship within the due limits laid down by Dignitatis humanae.  Such representatives could be chosen by those whom they represent.

Still under the general heading of misrepresentations we may include the reviewer’s statement that the book has an “odd libertarian streak”.  He offers no examples of libertarian doctrines to be found in the book.  It defines and dismisses libertarianism in a footnote, condemns usury and upholds the living wage.

We may now turn to those criticisms which are not due simply to misrepresentations.  Some are classic examples of the suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.  Thus, Commonweal’s reviewer quotes the authors’ statement that slavery can be a “valid legal relationship”, something which anyone who believes in the divine origin of the Hebrew scriptures must accept, omitting to mention that the term ‘slavery’ in their analysis extends to most forms of paid employment and without quoting their further statement that it is wise for other forms of slavery to be forbidden in modern conditions, given the immense scope which they afford for abuse. Nor does he mention that they describe slavery as “the most extreme of all evils” and declare chattel slavery (what most mean by the term) null and void. He also paraphrases the authors, crudely enough, as saying that women “must offer sex” to their husbands whenever requested, offensively insinuating thereby that a passing assertion of the fact that both spouses owe each other the marriage debt (an uncontroversial repetition of the doctrine of St Paul) is some sort of license for marital rape. The reviewer can offer his apologies to the Apostle to the Gentiles when he meets him.

Next, the reviewer finds fault with the book’s sub-title, ‘A manual of political philosophy’.  Writing a ‘manual’ is, he warns, “an attempt to channel authority” – which apparently means laying claim to an authority to which one is not entitled.  Worse, it is “a subtle power play”, implying that one’s statements may not be questioned.  However, nemesis is in store for our two authors: they fall unsuspecting into a “deep irony”, since manuals are “a thoroughly modern notion”.  Things were done quite differently in the Middle Ages, you see; St Thomas Aquinas would have had no truck with manuals, since “in his greatest works” he avoided “a timeless, completed system”; he was interested in “genuinely responding to objections and frankly grappling with conflicting authorities”.  Not for him the “distinctly modern anxiety” about disagreements among Catholic authors from which Crean and Fimister suffer.

What a pother.  A manual is a book written in a concise style about a well-defined subject where the clarity and logical development of ideas are particularly aimed at.  As such, it is an obvious pedagogical device for every age.  The Summa theologiae is a 13^th century manual of theology, albeit immeasurably superior to those of the 19^th and 20^th centuries, useful as these also are.  In the patristic period we may mention St John Damascene’s Exposition of the Orthodox Faith and St Augustine’s Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Charity as examples of the same genre: ‘enchiridion’ is simply the Greek for ‘manual’, since both words mean hand-book.  Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias is a manual of logic.  And so on.  Writing a manual on political philosophy yields no ‘irony’, whether deep or shallow.

In accusing the authors of Integralism of attempting, unlike St Thomas Aquinas, to write a ‘timeless, completed system’, the Commonweal reviewer is again writing at random, and, so to speak, thinking in clichés.  No one but a megalomaniac could suppose himself to have said the last word on any subject; but anyone who attempts to write philosophy or theology seeks to express timeless truths.  What is the Summa theologiae if not a vast ocean of such truths?

The authors are accused of ignoring “the messiness of Catholic tradition”.  Yet they mention many influential Catholic writers who have upheld positions with which they disagree, from Marsilius of Padua to Henry de Lubac, from William Barclay to Luigi Taparelli.   They note disagreements between important Catholic authorities, for example Suarez and Vitoria on the justification for an offensive war.  Even in the case of a doctor of the Church to whom they attribute a high authority, St Robert Bellarmine, they note that his account of the people as the subject of civil power was importantly qualified by Cardinal Ottaviani, and they consider that the 20^th century cardinal hit the target more precisely than his 16^th century predecessor.  The authors understand, with the angelic doctor, that in philosophy it takes time to reach the truth: the reviewer appears to confuse this proposition with the claim that there are no timeless truths to reach.

Integralism quotes from and harmonises a large number of fathers, saints and doctors of the Church, and many weighty magisterial teachings: for example, among others, St Gregory Nazianzen, St John Chrysostom, St Celestine I, St Leo I, St Gelasius I, St Augustine, St Gregory I, St John Damascene, St Gregory VII, St Peter Damian, St Bernard of Clairvaux, St Thomas Becket, St Thomas Aquinas, St Bonaventure, St Thomas More, St Robert Bellarmine, St Francis de Sales, Unam sanctam, Trent’s Decree on Baptism, Quanta cura, Libertas, Immortale Dei, Quas Primas, and Dignitatis humanae.  The reviewer nevertheless informs his readers that “the integralists’ problem is not too much tradition, but not enough – that they are depriving their followers of the richness and depth of Catholic political thought”.  Very good: we may now reasonably expect him to tell us about some of the riches and depths that Crean and Fimister overlooked, and then either to explain how these riches and depths complement the teachings which the authors have expounded, or, if the riches and depths are not compatible with these, why the teachings which Crean and Fimister overlooked should be given preference.  But he does nothing of the kind.  He simply tells us that Joseph Ratzinger once said that the teaching of Dignitatis humanae is in harmony with the patristic period – as if the authors had not said the same thing themselves, and explained why in great detail!

The reviewer is in fact ill at ease with the tradition of the fathers and doctors of the Church.  Referring to Crean and Fimister’s reference to the two swords in Luke 22 as standing for temporal and spiritual power, he accuses them of “exegetical perversities”, of twisting and abusing Scripture, and of serving the libido dominandi.  Strong words: but he omits to tell the reader what he must know at least from reading Integralism, namely, that this exegesis of the two swords is part of the patrimony of the Church, taught by many saints and doctors, and defined by Boniface VIII.  It is not Crean and Fimister whom he should be accusing of abusing Holy Scripture and serving the lust for power; it is St Peter Damian or St Bernard.  Let him do so if he dares.  Again, he would like to claim St Augustine for himself, but he will not find this easy when he reflects that the City of God gives as a model Christian ruler, Theodosius I, who made continuation in the right faith concerning the Blessed Trinity a requirement of Roman citizenship.

Commonweal’s reviewer objects not so much to Crean and Fimister as to Christendom itself.  For, despite the rhetorical dust kicked up by phrases such as “the messiness of Catholic tradition”, “debates that were precisely that: debates”, “the dialectical nature of tradition”, what he is opposing is the constitutional order that obtained from the time of Theodosius in the 4^th century to the French Revolution.  In this constitutional order, the temporal community was a community of the baptised, and temporal rulers understood that their highest duty and honour was to assist the spiritual power in bringing souls to heaven by laws which would foster sacramental life and the observance of the law of God while restraining the heresies by which all supernatural life is destroyed.  This was Christendom.  In addition to its citations from the saints and the magisterium, Integralism provides various further justifications of such an arrangement, including the need of sanctifying grace so that a society of fallen men may reach even its natural end; the rights of God and of Christ; the subordination of powers as flowing from the subordination of ends; and the desire to make it less hard for human beings to be saved.

The reviewer ignores these arguments, as he ignores the citations from the saints and the magisterium.  Instead, he provides, or rather gestures towards, a counter-argument drawn from Holy Scripture.  Integralists, that is, people who think that Christendom is a good thing, “forget that his [Christ’s] Lordship is manifest in service, and that his victory is accomplished in the powerless of the Cross.”  They need to have their “imaginations […] remolded by Christ’s crucified body”, since otherwise they “disfigure his ecclesial body”. This appears to mean that just as our Lord suffered death for our salvation, so Christian rulers, whether spiritual or temporal, ought to allow His Church to be attacked by evil forces and not to use any temporal power to repel them.

One could point out in reply, as St Thomas pointed out in reply to the suggestion that Jewish children be baptised against their parents’ wishes, that this is not how the Christian rulers whom the Church venerates ever behaved, and that this answer should be enough for a Catholic.   One might also point out that Blessed Pius IX infallibly condemned the opinion that rulers have no general duty to restrain violators of the Catholic religion, except as public order may require.  But we may also answer the argument on its own terms.  Our Saviour knew by His prophetic knowledge that it was the Father’s will that He should die for the world’s salvation on a certain day, at a certain time and place, and in a certain manner.  Until His hour arrived, Christ preached the word, and He made use of supernatural power to restrain those who sought to harm or silence Him (Lk. 4:30; Jn. 8:59).  Christian rulers do not generally have prophetic knowledge, and hence they cannot know that God in His wisdom requires them to imitate Christ’s ‘weakness’ on the Cross unless circumstances show them that providence has so decreed – as when Blessed Charles of Austria went his way into exile.  Unless such circumstances arise, therefore, they do well to imitate their Lord by having the gospel preached, and restraining by the power that God has given them those who would silence or corrupt the word.

 

The Teaching of Quanta cura is Definitive:

A Reply to Robert T. Miller

By Dr. John P. Joy

 

In his recent article on “Integralism and Catholic Doctrine” (here at Public Discourse), Robert T. Miller argues against the integralist ideal of a Catholic confessional state, understood as one in which the state would “officially endorse the Catholic faith and act as the secular arm of the Church by punishing heresy among the baptized and by restricting false religious practices if they threaten Catholicism.” More specifically, he takes issue with the thesis, advanced by Joseph G. Trabbic (here), that this integralist ideal is normative Catholic doctrine.

In the course of his attempt to prove the contrary, Miller raises the question of the doctrinal weight of Quanta cura, in which Pope Pius IX condemns the chief errors of the time. He admits that “many nineteenth-century theologians (including such greats as Louis Billot and John Henry Newman) thought at least some teachings in Pius IX’s 1864 encyclical Quanta cura were ex cathedra,” but argues that this is “untenable.”

On the contrary, Quanta cura is a clear and evident example of infallible teaching ex cathedra. Hence, Catholics are required to reject the propositions condemned by the encyclical. Anyone who does not “is opposed to the doctrine of the Catholic Church” (CIC 750, §2).

The Conditions for Infallible Papal Teaching

Miller gives two reasons in support of his conclusion against the infallibility of Quanta cura. The first is this: “Pius IX taught ex cathedra in his bull Ineffabilis Deus (1854) defining the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and Quanta Cura is nothing like Ineffabilis Deus.” This is true, but irrelevant. It is rather like saying that a child is not a human being because it is nothing like an adult; or that Pius IX was not the pope because he was nothing like St. Peter. A thing can fail to measure up to the most pre-eminent example of its kind or class while still being a member of that kind or class. The question is not whether Quanta cura measures up to Ineffabilis Deus, but whether it fulfills the conditions for infallible papal teaching set forth by Vatican I in Pastor aeternus and reiterated by Vatican II in Lumen gentium.

What are these conditions? The First Vatican Council defined that the pope is infallible when: “in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church” (PA 4).[1] According to the official relatio of Bishop Vincent Gasser on the intended sense of this definition, there are three essential conditions expressed therein: “The infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is restricted by reason of the subject, that is when the Pope, constituted in the chair of Peter, the center of the Church, speaks as universal teacher and supreme judge: it is restricted by reason of the object, i.e., when treating of matters of faith and morals; and by reason of the act itself, i.e., when the Pope defines what must be believed or rejected by all the faithful.”[2] These same three conditions are expressed even more succinctly in the Second Vatican Council’s reformulation of the doctrine: “The Roman pontiff, head of the college of bishops, by virtue of his office, enjoys this infallibility when, [subject] as supreme shepherd and teacher of all Christ’s faithful, who confirms his brethren in the faith (see Lk 22, 32), [act] he proclaims in a definitive act [object] a doctrine on faith or morals” (LG 25).[3]

Does Quanta cura fulfill these conditions? Let us look at the wording of the condemnation. Toward the end of the encyclical, Pius IX says this:

“In such great perversity of evil opinions, therefore, We, truly mindful of Our Apostolic duty, and especially solicitous about our most holy religion, about sound doctrine and the salvation of souls divinely entrusted to Us, and about the good of human society itself, have decided to lift Our Apostolic voice again. And so all and each evil opinion and doctrine individually mentioned in this letter, by Our Apostolic authority We reject, proscribe, and condemn; and We wish and command that they be considered as absolutely rejected, proscribed, and condemned by all the sons of the Catholic Church” (D 1699).[4]

Now the first condition, as we have seen, is that the pope must be “exercising his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority” (PA 4). According to Bishop Gasser’s official relatio on papal infallibility, this means that the pope must be speaking qua pope, that is, “as a public person in relation to the universal Church.… not, first of all, when he decrees something as a private teacher, nor only as the bishop and ordinary of a particular See and province, but when he teaches as exercising his office as supreme pastor and teacher of all Christians.”[5] Now there can be no doubt that in Quanta cura Pope Pius IX is exercising his office as supreme head of the Church. In the first place, the letter is addressed to all the bishops of the universal Church. And secondly, the pope explicitly invokes his apostolic authority. Miller makes a great deal of the fact that the he invokes “merely” his “apostolic authority” whereas in Ineffabilis Deus, he had invoked “the authority of Jesus Christ our Lord, of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and his own authority.” Certainly the latter is a more solemn formulation of invocation; but it is not required for papal infallibility.

The second condition, which regards the object of infallibility, is that the pope must be speaking about a matter of faith or morals. As Bishop Gasser explains in the relatio on papal infallibility,[6] and as subsequent Church teaching has made even more abundantly clear, the infallibility of the Church, and hence of the pope, extends not only to truths directly contained in divine revelation, but also to “each and every thing which is required to safeguard reverently and to expound faithfully the same deposit of faith” (CIC 750, §2). Now according to Pius IX, the “false and perverted errors” condemned in Quanta cura are to be detested because they tend toward this end: “to impede and remove that salutary force which the Catholic Church, according to the institution and command of her divine founder, must exercise freely ‘unto the consummation of the world’ [Matt. 28:20], no less toward individual men, than toward nations, peoples, and their highest leaders…” (D 1688). But if infallibility extends as far as is necessary to safeguard the deposit of faith, then it must extend far enough to condemn false opinions which threaten to undermine the very institutions and commands of Christ.

The third condition, which pertains to the act of infallibility, is that the pope must be “defining doctrine to be held by the whole Church” (PA 4) or “proclaiming doctrine by a definitive act” (LG 25). According to Gasser’s official relatio, this means that “there is required the manifest intention of defining doctrine, either of putting an end to doubt about a certain doctrine or of defining a thing, giving a definitive judgment and proposing that doctrine as one which must be held by the universal Church.”[7] Or in other words, “as very many theologians say, when he definitively and conclusively proposes his judgment.”[8] The act of definition is the giving of a judgment or sentence that is ‘definitive’ in the sense of ‘final’ or ‘conclusive’. In Quanta cura, this note of definition is manifest in the whole formula of condemnation, and especially in this, that all the faithful are explicitly commanded to hold the false opinions condemned therein as “absolutely rejected, proscribed, and condemned” (D 1699). There is nothing in the least provisional or inconclusive in such a phrase. It could hardly be more definitive.

Not only is Miller’s comparison of Quanta cura to Ineffabilis Deus poor procedure, it entirely overlooks the distinction between the more solemn modus definitorius, which is traditionally used in dogmatic definitions of truths to be believed as divinely revealed, such as is found in the definitions of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary, and the less solemn (but still infallible) modus definitivus, which is generally used in the definition of those truths not revealed in themselves but connected to divine revelation.

Heresy and the Lesser Theological Censures

Miller’s second argument has to do again with the object of infallibility. “Moreover,” he writes, “Pius never actually says that any of the condemned propositions is heretical (the opposite of de fide), leaving open the possibility that they are wrong in some lesser way (such as being ‘proximate to heresy,’ ‘erroneous,’ or ‘rash’—the so-called lesser theological censures).” It is unfortunately a common misconception that the pope is only infallible in defining divinely revealed dogmas or in condemning heresy, which is opposed to dogmas to be believed by divine and catholic faith. However, it is somewhat surprising that Miller falls into this error, since in the earlier part of his article he correctly distinguished between two levels of de fide teaching: “matters proposed ‘as divinely and formally revealed’ (propositions de fide divina et catholica)” and “matters ‘necessary for faithfully keeping and expounding the deposit of faith’ even if not themselves divinely revealed (propositions de fide ecclesiastica et catholica).” The doctrinal commentary of the CDF on the Profession of Faith uses a simpler terminology of de fide credenda (to be believed by faith) and de fide tenenda (to be held by faith).

As Miller himself correctly points out, the infallibility of the Church extends to both kinds of de fide teaching. And yet when it comes to the practical application of this principle with respect to Quanta cura, he restricts the scope of papal infallibility to the condemnation of heresy, which is opposed to dogmas of divine and catholic faith (de fide credenda), and excludes the condemnation of errors which are opposed to truths of Catholic doctrine (de fide tenenda). His mistake appears to lie in thinking that it is heresy to reject any de fide teaching, whereas in fact heresy is only opposed to teaching that is de fide in the strict sense, which is de fide credenda.

Gasser’s relatio makes it abundantly clear that papal infallibility is not to be restricted to the condemnation of heresy, but extends also to lesser theological censures such as ‘erroneous’ and ‘proximate to heresy’. In response to several fathers of the council who had raised this very question, Gasser explains:

“Indeed, the Deputation de fide is not of the mind that this word should be understood in a juridical sense (Lat. In sensu forensi) so that it only signifies putting an end to controversy which has arisen in respect to heresy and doctrine which is properly speaking de fide. Rather, the word ‘defines’ signifies that the pope directly and conclusively pronounces his sentence about a doctrine that concerns matters of faith or morals and does so in such a way that each one of the faithful can be certain of the mind of the Apostolic See, of the mind of the Roman pontiff; in such a way, indeed, that he or she knows for certain that such and such a doctrine is held to be heretical, proximate to heresy, certain or erroneous, et cetera, by the Roman pontiff. Such, therefore, is the meaning of the word ‘defines’.”[9]

Miller is right that according to canon law, “No doctrine is understood as defined infallibly unless this is manifestly evident” (CIC 749, §3). But it cannot reasonably count against the definitiveness of a teaching if its infallibility is not manifest to everyone, especially those with an incomplete grasp of what is required for infallibility. It is enough if it is manifestly evident in itself.

Contrary to Sacred Scripture, the Church, and the Most Holy Fathers

Having dispensed with the particular case of Quanta cura, Miller extends his argument to defend a more general claim that the integralist ideal of the Catholic confessional state cannot be taught infallibly, since it does not fall within the scope of “matters ‘divinely revealed’, things closely connected thereto, and the principles of natural law.” He proceeds to give his reasons for thinking that the doctrine in question is not part of the natural law, nor to be found in Scripture, nor in tradition, and then claims that this is why “none of the popes teaching this doctrine ever claimed it was divinely revealed (or closely connected to anything so revealed).” But this is simply false, as is especially clear with respect to the very condemnation cited by Miller as one of the strongest arguments for integralism, namely: “that the best condition of society is the one in which there is no acknowledgement by the government of the duty of restraining, by established penalties, offenders of the Catholic religion, except insofar as the public peace demands” (D 1689). And this false doctrine is to be condemned, according to Pius IX, as being “contrary to the doctrine of Sacred Scripture, of the Church, and of the most holy Fathers” (D 1689).

The Infallible Condemnations of Quanta cura

If the condemnations contained in Quanta cura are indeed infallible, Catholics ought to know what they are in order to avoid them. In the course of his argument, Miller twice implies that it is difficult to know which propositions are condemned in Quanta cura, but this is not true. They are easy to identify if one takes the trouble to read the whole letter. The errors infallibly condemned in Quanta cura are these:

1. “That the best plan for public society, and civil progress absolutely requires that human society be established and governed with no regard to religion, as if it did not exist, or at least, without making distinction between the true and the false religions” (D 1689).
2. “That the best condition of society is the one in which there is no acknowledgment by the government of the duty of restraining, by established penalties, offenders of the Catholic religion, except insofar as the public peace demands” (D 1689).
3. “That liberty of conscience and of worship is the proper right of every man, and should be proclaimed and asserted by law in every correctly established society; that the right to all manner of liberty rests in the citizens, not to be restrained by either ecclesiastical or civil authority; and that by this right they can manifest openly and publicly and declare their own concepts, whatever they be, by voice, by print, or in any other way” (D 1690).
4. “That the will of the people, manifested as they say by public opinion, or in some other way, constitutes the supreme law, freed from all divine and human right; and, that deeds consummated in the political order, by the very fact that they have been consummated, have the force of right” (D 1691).
5. “That [religious] orders have no legitimate reason for existing” (D 1692).
6. “That from the citizens and the Church must be taken away the power by which they can ask for alms openly in the cause of Christian charity, and also that the law should be repealed by which on some fixed days, because of the worship of God, servile works are prohibited” (D 1693).
7. “That domestic society or the family borrows the whole reason for its existence from the civil law alone; and, hence, all rights of parents over their children, especially the right of caring for their instruction and education, emanate from and depend wholly on the civil law” (D 1694).
8. “That the clergy as an enemy to the true and useful progress of science and government, must be removed from all responsibility and duty of instructing and training youth” (D 1695).
9. “That the laws of the Church do not bind in conscience, except when promulgated by the civil power” (D 1697).
10. “That the acts and decrees of the Roman Pontiffs relating to religion and the Church, need the sanction and approval, or at least the assent, of the civil power” (D 1697).
11. “That the Apostolic Constitutions, in which secret societies are condemned, whether an oath of secrecy is demanded in them or not, and their followers and sympathizers are punished with anathema, have no force in those regions of the world where societies of this sort are allowed by the civil government” (D 1697).
12. “That the excommunication uttered by the Council of Trent and the Roman Pontiffs against those who invade and usurp the rights and possessions of the Church rests upon a confusion between the spiritual order and the civil and political order for the attaining of a mundane good only” (D 1697).
13. “That the Church should decree nothing which could bind the consciences of the faithful in relation to the use of temporal goods” (D 1697).
14. “That to the Church does not belong the right to coerce by temporal punishments violators of its laws” (D 1697).
15. “That it is conformable to the principles of sacred theology, and to the principles of public law for the civil government to claim and defend the ownership of the goods which are possessed by churches, by religious orders, and by other pious places” (D 1697).
16. “That the ecclesiastical power is not by divine right distinct from and independent of the civil power, and that the distinction and independence of the same could not be preserved without the essential rights of the civil power being invaded and usurped by the Church” (D 1698).
17. “That without sin and with no loss of Catholic profession, one can withhold assent and obedience to those judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See, whose object is declared to relate to the general good of the Church and its rights and discipline, provided it does not touch dogmas of faith or morals” (D 1698).

Today no less than in 1864 all Catholics are obliged to reject and condemn each and every one of these false ideas and opinions.

__________________________________________________________________________________________

[1] Vatican I, Pastor aeternus, cap. 4; Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (DEC), ed. Norman P. Tanner, S.J. (Sheed & Ward; Georgetown University Press, 1990), 816.

[2] The Gift of Infallibility: The Official Relatio on Infallibility of Bishop Vincent Ferrer Gasser at Vatican I, trans. James T. O’Connor (Ignatius Press, 2008), 49; Mansi 52:1214C.

[3] Vatican II, Lumen gentium, 25; DEC 869.

[4] Denzinger: The Sources of Catholic Dogma, 30^th ed., trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Loreto Publications, 2007).

[5] The Gift of Infallibility, 77; Mansi 52:1225B.

[6] See The Gift of Infallibility, 78-81; Mansi 52:1225-27.

[7] The Gift of Infallibility, 77; Mansi 52:1225C.

[8] The Gift of Infallibility, 81; Mansi 52:1227B.

[9] The Gift of Infallibility, 92; Mansi 52:1316A-B.